2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-31-2011

Lawrence Tennille v. Francisco Quintana

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

Recommended Citation
"Lawrence Tennille v. Francisco Quintana" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 614.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/614

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

CLD-270

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2682
___________
LAWRENCE KEMP TENNILLE,
Appellant
v.

FRANCISCO J. QUINTANA, EX-WARDEN; ROD SMITH, HEALTH SERVICES
ADMINISTRATOR; S.L. NOLAN, ASSOCIATE WARDEN; STEPHEN D. GAGNON,
ASSOCIATE WARDEN; DENISE A. HALE, EMPLOYEE SERVICE MANAGER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00238)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
August 18, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed August 31, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Lawrence Kemp Tennille, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from an
order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary

judgment. Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that the appeal does not
present a substantial question. Therefore, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
In September 2009, Tennille filed a complaint, which he later amended, alleging
that prison officials at FCI-McKean denied his requests to have prescription eyeglasses
mailed to him from the manufacturer after they were purchased by his family at a cost of
$250.1 Tennille asserted that the actions of the prison officials constituted a conspiracy to
retaliate against him for filing a civil complaint and violated his rights to due process and
equal protection. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment, arguing that Tennille failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
and, in any event, failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The matter
was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended that summary judgment be
entered in favor of the defendants based on Tennille’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. In particular, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, although Tennille had fully
pursued administrative remedies with respect to an allegation that the denial of eyeglasses
violated prison policies, he failed to raise due process, equal protection, conspiracy, and
retaliation claims in the administrative remedy process.2 Over Tennille’s objections, the
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and entered
1

The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) did provide Tennille with new prescription eyeglasses free of
charge through its UNICOR program.
2

The Magistrate Judge noted that, to the extent Tennille’s exhausted grievance could be
construed to include a due process claim, such a claim failed because a violation of prison
regulations in itself is not a constitutional violation. See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847
(8th Cir. 2003).
2

judgment in favor of the defendants. After the District Court denied Tennille’s motion
for reconsideration, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Tennille appealed.
We exercise plenary review over an order granting a motion for summary
judgment. Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). A grant of
summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (amended Dec. 1, 2010). “We review the facts in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.” Coolspring Stone
Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). We can affirm
the judgment of the District Court on any basis supported by the record. Brown v. Pa.
Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs., 318 F.3d 473, 475 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003).
Initially, we conclude that the Magistrate Judge erred in holding that Tennille
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific acts of
unconstitutional conduct by prison officials until the inmate has exhausted available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2001).

The PLRA requires “proper”

exhaustion, meaning that the inmate must follow the procedural requirements of the
prison grievance system. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2004). The
BOP has established a multi-tier administrative remedy procedure, which requires that an
inmate, after attempting to resolve an issue informally, file a formal Administrative
Remedy Request on an appropriate form. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13(a); 542.14. If the inmate
is dissatisfied with the prison’s response, the inmate may pursue appeals to the Regional
3

Director and, ultimately, to the General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). In this case,
Tennille followed the proper procedures, complaining at each level about the denial of his
request to have prescription eyeglasses sent to him from the manufacturer.
As the defendants acknowledged, “there is no dispute that [Tennille] exhausted his
available administrative remedies with respect to his claim that denying his request to
have eyeglasses sent to him violated prison policy.” Although Tennille’s administrative
grievances did not cite the specific constitutional grounds on which his complaint is
based, we conclude that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies. Nyhuis v.
Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77-78 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that “[c]ompliance with the
administrative remedy scheme will be satisfactory if it is substantial.”); see also Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (noting that “the primary purpose of a grievance is to
alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official
that he may be sued.” (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004))).
Nevertheless, Tennille’s due process, equal protection, retaliation, and conspiracy
claims fail on their merits.3 When reviewing these claims, we accept as true all of the
allegations contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in favor of
Tennille. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). To survive
dismissal, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
3

We note that the defendants addressed the merits of these claims in their motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for summary judgment.
4

Deprivation of inmate property by prison officials does not state a cognizable due
process claim if the prisoner has an adequate post-deprivation state remedy. Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Here, adequate remedies were available to Tennille,
who sought relief through the administrative remedy process.

Tillman v. Lebanon

County Corr., 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000). Furthermore, Tennille did not state an
equal protection claim, as he failed to allege that the defendants permitted eyeglasses to
be sent to other similarly situated inmates. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,
239 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that plaintiff’s “claim must fail because he does not allege the
existence of similarly situated individuals”). We also reject Tennille’s unsupported claim
that the defendants refused his request for privately purchased eyeglasses in retaliation
for filing a lawsuit against mailroom staff. This claim falters insofar as Tennille failed to
rebut record evidence indicating that the defendants denied his request because the value
of the eyeglasses exceeded the amount authorized by an internal prison regulation. See
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “once a prisoner
demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or motivating
factor in the challenged decision, the prison officials may still prevail by proving that
they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest”); cf. Maberry v. McKune, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 1222, 1228-29 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding that regulation which imposed quantity
and value limitations on property which inmates were allowed to possess did not violate
equal protection or due process rights). Finally, Tennille’s conclusory and unsupported
allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
5

Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992) (agreeing that “plaintiffs
failed to assert any facts from which any type of conspiratorial agreement . . . can be
inferred.”). There is no indication that Tennille could amend his complaint so as to
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by
this appeal. See I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment.
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